Privilege Escalation via Logrotate in Gitlab Omnibus
Target: GitLab Omnibus
Version: 7.4 through 12.2.1
Fixed in Version: 12.2.3, 12.1.8 and 12.0.8
Author: Wolfgang Hotwagner (AIT Austrian Institute of Technology)
GitLab Omnibus sets the ownership of the log directory to the system-user "git", which might let local users obtain root access because of unsafe interaction with logrotate.
User “git” owns the log directory /var/log/gitlab:
ERROR: Content Element with uid "45106" and type "ar_codeelem" has no rendering definition!
Log files rotate once a day (or any other frequency if configured) by logrotate as user root. The configuration does not use the “su” directive:
ERROR: Content Element with uid "45108" and type "ar_codeelem" has no rendering definition!
Due to logrotate is prone to a race-condition it is possible for user "git" to replace the
directory /var/log/gitlab/gitlab-workhorse/ with a symbolic link to any
directory(for example /etc/bash_completion.d). Logrotate will place
files as user “root” into /etc/bash_completition.d and set the owner of the file to "git".
An attacker could simply place a reverse-shell into this file. As soon as root logs in, a reverse
root-shell will be executed.
Details of the race-condition in logrotate can be found at:
Proof of Concept
The following example illustrates how an attacker who already gained a shell as user “git”, can elevate his privileges to “root”. After downloading and compiling, the exploit gets executed and waits until the next daily run of logrotate. If the rotation of the log file succeeds, a new file that contains the reverse shell payload, will be written into /etc/bash_completition.d/ with owner “git”. As soon as root logs in, the reverse shell gets executed and opens a shell on the attackers netcat listener:
ERROR: Content Element with uid "45110" and type "ar_codeelem" has no rendering definition!
7.4 through 12.2.1
An attacker who already achieved a valid shell as user “git” could elevate the privileges to “root”. The fact that another exploit is needed to get a shell lowers the severity from high to low.
|2019-05-12||Contacting vendor through HackerOne|
|2019-05-31||GitLab acknowledges the vulnerability|
|2019-08-22||Notification from GitLab about the release that includes a patch|
|2019-08-30||GitLab changed the severity from high to low and released an update that fixed the problem|